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Abstract 
In this paper we study the specialization of Spanish banks along two intertwined dimensions: 
size and ownership form. We find some interesting results at odds with the existing empirical 
literature. As commercial banks increase their size, they lend more to large borrowers but 
that is not the case for the largest banks. For savings banks, the larger the size the more 
likely is the lending to small borrowers. Moreover, we find evidence that larger commercial 
banks are more willing to lend to low credit quality borrowers than medium size banks, while 
the opposite is true among savings banks. Banks’ specialization in lending to business firms 
seems to go across the reputation considerations, risk shifting behavior and lending 
technologies most often considered in the literature. 
JEL classification: D23, G21. 
Keywords: bank specialization, transactional lending, relational lending, ownership form. 
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1 Introduction 
The banking industry involves banks of different size and ownership. One way to reconcile the 
persistent diversity in organizational forms with the presumption that size and ownership 
matter as organizational choices, is to recognize that banking services are not an 
homogeneous commodity and diversity in organizational forms reflects opportunities for 
market segmentation and specialization. 
This paper studies diversity and specialization in the market of bank credit to Spanish 
non-financial firms in the period 1996 to 2003. The case study is particularly relevant because 
in Spain, besides diversity in sizes of banks, there is also a significant diversity of ownership 
forms (i.e. commercial for profit banks, not-for-profit savings banks and credit cooperatives), 
with no clear market dominance of one form over the others. Second, during the period 1996 
to 2003, Spain, in the process of joining the Euro zone, has evolved from tight to loose 
monetary policy. The result has been an intense merger activity involving banks of all sizes 
and, in particular, mergers among the largest commercial banks. However, ownership 
diversity has increased over time since savings banks and credit cooperatives today represent 
half of the market share of Spanish retail banking, compared with one third ten years ago. The 
Spanish case offers a unique opportunity to study size and ownership specialization of banks 
in a period when competitive conditions pressed towards efficient decisions and when 
not-for-profit savings banks outperform for profit commercial banks in competitive credit 
markets. 
Bank specialization in business loans is studied along the combined dimensions of 
ownership form and size of the bank. Altogether, seven possible choices are identified, four 
size classes in commercial banks, two in savings banks and one in cooperatives. The credit 
market is described in terms of likelihood of observing one alternative of the seven available in 
a particular loan decision, as a function of characteristics of borrowers and loans and a set of 
control variables. We test if commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives of 
similar size lend differently to particular segments of borrowers, and whether within each 
ownership form, size matters as a specialization variable, and if it matters in the same way for 
all ownership forms. 
The main hypothesis around the size specialization of banks, tested in the paper, 
is that larger banks will tent to specialize in larger borrowers and, for any size, in borrowers 
with easy to observe credit quality; the so called “informational simpler borrowers” in Carey 
et al. (1998). This hypothesis is justified in the grounds that larger banks have higher agency 
costs in delegated decision making that relies in soft information and therefore are forced to 
specialize in borrowers whose credit quality can be assessed using hard data (transactional 
lending), Stein (2002)1. 
 Banks’ specialization as a function of ownership form considers mainly risk taking 
behavior of banks in each ownership form. The main hypothesis is that, within a size class, 
                                                                          
1. Further discussion of differences between transactional and relational lending in Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Boot 
and Thakor (2000), Berger and Udell (2002), Brickley et al. (2003), Berger (2004). In addition, the relationship between 
bank size and credit to small versus large firms has been extensively investigated [Berger et al. (1995), Berger and 
Udell (1996), Strahan and Weston (1996), Cole et al. (2004)], including the effects of M&A [Berger et al. (1998), Strahan 
and Weston (1998), Sapienza (2002)], and the impact of internal organization and complexity of banks [Berger and 
Udell (2002), Berger et al. (2002), Brickley et al. (2003)], on the availability and terms of credit to small firms. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0606 
non-shareholder ownership forms, and, in particular, workers/managers’ controlled 
organizations, such as savings banks and credit cooperatives, as well as managers’ 
controlled commercial banks, will be more conservative than shareholders owned 
commercial banks in loan granting decisions, Jensen and Meckling (1976)2. Secondly, as in 
Carey et al. (1998), we also test if reputation affects the lending specialization of savings 
banks compared with commercial banks. Not-for-profit organizations such as savings banks 
are expected to be more trustworthy than commercial banks, Hansmann (1996). To preserve 
a reputation of reasonableness in loan renegotiations (i.e. to make credible the promise of 
refrain from extracting maximum rents in these renegotiations) savings banks are less likely 
than commercial banks to force defaulting borrowers into liquidation and, therefore, more 
likely to continue granting loans to defaulted borrowers (ex post high risk). 
We use a unique database, the Credit Register (CIR) of Banco de España, which 
contains information on the whole population of loans above 6,000 euros granted by any 
credit institution operating in Spain. We focus on new loans to non-financial firms granted 
in the period 1996 to 20033. Only Berger and Udell (1996), Carey et al. (1998), and Cole 
et al. (2004) use individual loan data in previous empirical work4. We focus on new loans 
granted during the period, instead of analyzing the whole stock of loans. This has important 
advantages to study size specialization by banks and firms since the flow of new loans 
captures the changes more rapidly than the total stock of bank loans. For each loan granted 
we know the amount of the loan and the size of the borrower, so we can isolate the effects of 
both variables in the specialization decision. 
We find that both size and ownership form are relevant dimensions to explain bank 
specialization. As commercial banks increase their size, they focus more on loans to larger 
borrowers (transactional lending) but that is not the case for the largest banks. Among 
savings banks, the larger their size, the more likely they lend to borrowers of smaller size 
(relational lending). Overall, controlling for size, savings banks and credit cooperatives 
specialize more in small borrowers than commercial banks. Therefore, the ownership 
form of the bank affects in a different way the specialization decisions among the 
information-problematic borrowers dimension (size of the borrower). Second, we find that 
medium size savings banks and credit cooperatives are more likely to lend to borrowers of 
observed ex ante low credit quality than commercial banks of the same size. The likelihood of 
granting a loan by saving banks and cooperatives, compared with commercial banks of equal 
size, is higher in loans with collateral than in loans with no collateral. These results are 
consistent with higher reputation concerns among savings banks and cooperatives than 
among commercial banks. However, no evidence is found supporting the hypothesis that 
ownership form conditions lending specialization through different incentives for risk shifting 
behavior. 
The analysis of specialization along ownership forms departs from Carey et al. (1998) 
because we compare three forms of ownership which belong to the general class of what 
                                                                          
2. Risk shifting behavior, to increase shareholder value by undertaking risky projects that lower the economic value of 
debt under limited liability of the firm is more likely in highly leveraged firms such as banks. Existing research has 
paid attention to how the ownership form, banks versus finance companies, Carey et al. (1998), stock or mutual thrifts, 
Esty (1997a, b), and the share ownership dispersion of banks, [Saunders et al. (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995)], can 
segment credit markets in response to different incentives for risk shifting behavior. 
3. A detailed analysis of the content of the CIR is in Jiménez and Saurina (2004) and Jiménez et al. (2006). 
4. We are unable to observe loan applications that have been rejected by banks so we cannot separate the application 
and the approval or rejection decisions of loans. Cole et al. (2004) find similar results when the approval-rejection 
decision is explained jointly with the application decision and when it is explained separately, which suggests that are 
banks those who choose the borrower they want to do business with. 
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they call “generic intermediaries”. In addition, we study potential differences in the size 
of the bank/size of the borrower specialization decision within each ownership form. 
Moreover, our sample includes loans to borrowers of all sizes and we compare borrower 
specialization decisions controlling for characteristics of loans and banks. It also departs from 
Esty (1997a and b) because we consider other dimensions of specialization apart from risk 
taking behavior (i.e. reputation factors), and we include a unique ownership form, savings 
banks (“cajas de ahorros”), with a loose definition of property rights but very effective in 
gaining market share to commercial banks in recent years5. 
Within the literature that tests for the size of the bank/size of the borrower 
specialization (transactional versus relational lending) hypothesis (footnote 1), the paper is the 
first to investigate, with new and challenging results, differences in the pattern of size 
specialization across ownership forms. If the ownership form affects control losses and 
coordination and motivation failures in the internal workings of banks, then the nature of the 
relationship between size of the bank and choice of lending technology within each ownership 
form will inform us about differences in management costs across organization forms. 
Moreover, the test of the hypothesis is made, for the first time, controlling for differences in 
size of the loan, which is important because large banks can grant loans of any size while 
small banks have limitations to grant large loans due to regulatory constraints to risk 
concentration. The evidence found supports that size and ownership specialization in banks’ 
lending are interdependent and, for this reason, should be investigated jointly, as we do in this 
paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some stylized facts 
about new loans to Spanish non-financial firms and a summary of ownership characteristics 
of banks in Spain. Section 3 summarizes the literature and states the main hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 4 explains the variables and methodology used while section 5 presents the 
results of the empirical tests. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
                                                                          
5. The distinction between commercial and savings bank is parallel to the distinction between banks and thrifts in 
the US, although the ownership of Spanish savings banks is quite unique as we show later. 
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2 Institutional framework and credit market data 
Among Spanish banks we have three forms of ownership, commercial banks, savings banks 
and credit cooperatives. Commercial banks are companies owned by shareholders. Savings 
banks can be assimilated to not-for-profit commercial organizations [Hansmann (1996)]; 
commercial because they are subject to the same regulatory and competitive conditions than 
the rest of ownership forms; not-for-profit because the profits they make have as destination 
either retained earnings or a “social dividend” (pay for social or cultural programs in benefit of 
the community). Credit cooperatives can be assimilated to mutual thrifts. 
In commercial banks, residual decision rights belong to the shareholders that may in 
turn delegate them to the management team. In savings banks the decision rights are 
allocated to a General Assembly of representatives elected by public authorities (up to 50%), 
by depositors, by workers and by the founding entity (which can be a civic, religious or 
government-related organization). The General Assembly elects the Board of Directors that in 
turn elects the management team. In credit cooperatives residual decision rights belong to 
the creditors. They are banks that were first created to lend to producer cooperatives in the 
agriculture sector and, at the same time, to provide bank services in rural areas. The farming 
cooperatives were the formal owners of the bank under limited liability, but with severe 
restrictions on the banking operations they were allowed to perform. In many cases, the 
farming cooperatives and the individual partners also held deposits in the bank. Therefore, the 
closest organization that credit cooperatives resemble is a mutual company of borrowers. 
Today credit cooperatives can perform the same operations as savings and commercial 
banks. 
Banks also differ in size. For the purpose of this study we group banks in four 
size classes: Small, banks with € 1,000 million in total loans or less; Medium, banks with 
between € 1,000 and 25,000 million of loans; Large, with loans above € 25,000 million, and 
Very large, banks that also have loans above € 25,000 million6. The distinction between the 
last two groups of banks is based on the fact that very large banks are those that in addition 
have been involved recently in mega-mergers. That is, four of the largest commercial banks in 
Spain in 1999 and 2000 entered into two merger processes that ended in two very large 
banks, well ahead in terms of total assets, costumers, etc. of the following third and 
subsequent banks. Therefore, it is interesting to separate large and very large banks attending 
to merger developments. Moreover, both mega-merged banks are the only ones that have 
significant amounts of assets in foreign markets (Europe and Latin America), so that, they can 
be considered as internationally active banks7. Henceforth, we will refer to them as very large 
banks, although we could also label them mega-merged banks and/or internationally active 
banks. 
                                                                          
6. In choosing size breakdowns we depart from the existing (US) literature in two aspects. First of all, given that we are 
analyzing loan specialization, we use the loan portfolio of the bank as the reference for the size breakdown. Two banks 
with the same size of their loan portfolios may differ substantially in total assets if interbank positions are large and 
of opposed signs. Secondly, we adapt the cut off points to the Spanish market were we do not have unibranch banks 
and, thus, banks are not extremely small as implied by the breakdowns used in the US literature [Berger et al. (2001 
and 2002), among others]. On the contrary, we have some very large banks both in absolute and relative terms so that 
the limit of 10 billion of assets often used to separate small from large banks would not capture the size distribution of 
Spanish banks. 
7. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision intends to apply new capital requirements (the so-called Basel II) mainly 
for those internationally active banks. 
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Loan data refers to the flow of new loans granted by any Spanish bank to 
non-financial firms every year from 1996 to 2003 registered in the CIR. For each loan, 
information is available about the size and ownership form of the lender; the size, credit 
quality, industry and region of the borrower; and about characteristics of the loan such as 
size, maturity and collateral. The interest rate charged to the loan is not reported. 
2.1 Volume and general characteristics of loans 
In 1996 new bank loans of one year maturity or more to non-financial firms amounted 
€ 36,239 million, approximately 7.8% of the Spanish GDP. Seven years later, in 2003, that 
amount was almost four times larger, € 127,935 million, 17.2% of the GDP. In the same 
period, the number of new loans raised from 186,147 to 400,789, as well as the average size 
of the loan (from € 195 thousand to € 319 thousand). By industry, Construction and Real 
Estate concentrates more than one third of the amount of new loans yearly granted although 
less than one forth of the number of loans. New loans to Retail industries (i.e. commerce, 
restaurants, …), concentrate almost one third of the number of loans but only represent one 
fifth in amount. In the eight-year period 44.2% of the loans granted are short term (maturity 
up to three years), 22.2% are medium term (maturity between 3 and 5 years); and 33.6% are 
long term (maturity above 5 years). However, long term loans concentrate higher volume of 
total lending since the size of loans increases with maturity. Finally, 42% of the amount of new 
loans has been secured with collateral slightly more than one forth of the loans.  
The distribution of credit across loan size groups (Table1, Panel A) shows a steady 
relative decline in terms of amount for the two smallest size classes (below € 100,000). Both 
concentrate almost 70% of the total number of loans but only 7.8% of the volume of credit. 
In 2003 the proportion of loans with size above € 2 million, the largest size class, is 2.5% 
but 56.4% of the volume of credit. Borrowers of small and middle size (less than € 1 million of 
total credit at 2003 prices) concentrate 87% of the loans but only 20.3% of the volume of new 
credit (Table 1, Panel B). Very large borrowers (those with a balance of over € 20 million) 
concentrate 0.7% of the loans and 41.2% of the amount of credit. In the period 1996 to 2003 
the Spanish banking sector has experienced a consolidation process, so that in 1996 there 
where 277 active banks and in 2003, 212 (Table 1, Panel C). The consolidation process has 
affected mostly to small banks and to the largest ones. The number of large banks increases 
over time from just 3 banks in 1996 to 12 banks in 2003. This increase is the result of organic 
growth of medium size banks. From 1996 to 2000 large banks increase their market share 
(from 17.3% to 30.7%) mainly at the expense of medium and small size banks (from 58.1 
to 48.1%). The expansion of large banks continues after 2000, but now more at the expense 
of very large banks, those that merge, whose market share in the volume of loans decreases 
from 21.2% in 2000 to 14.7% in 2003. 
2.2 Market share across size classes of borrowers 
Table 2 shows the time evolution of market share of banks in each size class across groups 
of borrowers of different size. In 1996, the amount of new credit to small and medium size 
borrowers was originated in almost two thirds in small and medium banks. On the other 
hand, the largest borrowers received more than 50% of the flow of new credit from small and 
medium banks and 20% and 26.2% from large and very large banks, respectively. Thus, 
small and medium size banks were relatively more important in financing small and medium 
size borrowers. However, in 2003 the situation has changed significantly. Small and medium 
size banks together supply less than 40% of the new credit to small and medium size 
borrowers. Moreover, large and very large banks provide around 60% of the new credit 
obtained by large and very large borrowers. Therefore, in 2003, within banks of a given size 
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class, the share of credit is similar across borrowers of different sizes (splitting banks into two 
broad groups). Conclusions do not change when size of the borrower is proxied by size of the 
loan. 
The relation between size of the banks and size of the borrowers they lend to can be 
viewed also from the distribution of credit to borrowers of different size for banks within a size 
class (Table 3). The group of very large banks shows the lowest percentage of their credit 
concentrated in borrowers of small and medium size and the proportion is lower after 2000. 
On the other hand, small and medium size banks tend to concentrate a higher proportion 
of their credit in smaller borrowers. However, after year 2000, small banks increase the 
proportion of credit concentrated in very large borrowers, while very large banks decrease it. 
Therefore, there is a change towards a more homogeneous distribution of loans among 
borrowers of different size, in each size class of banks. So, larger banks tend to lend 
relatively more to larger companies, as in the US empirical literature [Berger et al. (1995), 
Berger and Udell (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1996) and Strahan and Weston (1996)], but 
the specialization effect is not so pronounced. 
2.3 Market share across ownership form 
In 1996 commercial banks have 66% of market share in new loans to non-financial firms; 
savings banks 31.5% and cooperatives 2.5% (Table 4). In 2003 commercial banks continue 
with the largest market share but the differences have been reduced: 51%, 44.9%, and 4.1%, 
respectively. The loss in market share of commercial banks is not so pronounced in terms of 
number of loans. Therefore, savings banks and cooperatives gain proportionally more market 
share in larger loans (and borrowers). 
Commercial banks have the largest market share in any borrower class size in 
almost all the period (Table 4). In 1996 small and medium size borrowers receive, on average, 
over 53% of the amount of the new credit they get from commercial banks, 41% from 
savings banks and 6% from cooperatives. Very large borrowers get 74.1% of their credit from 
commercial banks, 25.2% from savings banks and 0.7% from cooperatives. Seven years later 
the proportions of credit to small and medium size borrowers by types of banks are only 4 
percentage points (pp) lower in commercial banks, distributed between savings banks and 
cooperatives. But for very large borrowers, the proportions are 53.5%, 45%, and 1.5%, 
respectively, that is, around 20 pp market share shift between commercial and savings 
banks. Commercial banks lost market share among borrowers of large or very large size at 
the expense of savings banks at a higher speed until year 2000. Since then, cooperatives 
gain market share in loans to large and very large borrowers. Therefore, savings banks and, 
to a lesser extend, cooperatives, have overcome any possible competitive disadvantage 
versus commercial banks among large and very large borrowers they might have had. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of credit across borrower sizes for each form of bank 
ownership. Savings banks and cooperatives have a larger proportion of their new credit to 
firms concentrated in small and medium size borrowers than commercial banks. That pattern 
is maintained over time. However, the differences are progressively reduced and in year 2003 
commercial banks concentrate 43.3% of the volume of new loans in very large borrowers, 
while savings banks concentrate 41.3%. Savings banks and cooperatives increase over time 
the proportion of total new loans they grant to large and very large borrowers. Commercial 
banks maintain almost stable the proportion of total credit they grant to small and medium 
size borrowers, while reduce their credit to very large borrowers and increase the proportion 
to large ones. 
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The preliminary evidence shown suggests that size and ownership form of the bank 
can affect bank specialization. Moreover, the pattern of specialization can be different from 
that one observed in other studies from the US. The organization of American bank credit 
markets is different, more fragmented in a large number of small banks and with more 
homogeneous general intermediaries, in the language of Carey et al. (1998). In Spain banking 
markets are more concentrated and the consolidation process has affected both small and 
very large banks. Liberalization of branch opening for savings banks in 1988, as the final step 
of a broad liberalization process, coincides with a period of increasing ownership 
differentiation in Spanish credit markets, with saving banks and credit cooperatives, general 
intermediaries, increasing market share at the expense of commercial banks. The very large 
of these commercial banks get involved in national mergers and international acquisitions, 
mainly of banks in Latin America. This happens at the same time that they loose market share 
in Spanish credit markets. The rest of the paper will go into a deeper multivariate analysis of 
the bank specialization, after an overview of the main theoretical hypothesis on its 
determinants. 
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3 Literature review and general hypotheses 
Previous research relates the size of the bank/size of the borrower specialization decision with 
the comparative advantage of banks of different size in using one of the two main lending 
technologies, transactional or relational. Ownership form of the bank, on the other hand, has 
been considered a relevant variable in explaining the risk exposure of banks as a 
consequence, partly, of risk taking behavior in lending decisions. Much less is known about 
the comparative advantage of ownership in the use of one lending technology or the other. 
The banking literature has identified two basic lending technologies for banks, 
transactional lending, or arms-length contracts, and relational lending, implicit and long term 
contracts. Berger and Udell (2002) present a detailed review of the two8. Large banks tend to 
be recognized as having clear disadvantages when it comes to be involved in relational 
lending [Stein (2002)]. Qualitative and contextual information used in a loan transaction flows 
costly and with high control loss along hierarchical levels. Agency problems between branch 
managers (or loan officers) involved in the loan granting decision and profit oriented 
shareholders, can be very severe and difficult to solve through managerial incentive contracts 
[Brickley et al. (2003)]. Large banks have to rely on hard, quantitative, data when dealing with 
borrowers, easy to verify by distant general managers who control branch officers and report 
to boards and shareholders. On the other hand, organizations with few hierarchical levels and 
short distance between residual claimants and decision-makers, such as small banks, can 
lower the loss of control in the hierarchy and for these banks concentrated ownership is 
expected to go together with broader decision making authority to local managers. If scale 
economies in transactional lending are modest, small banks can also be competitive in this 
technology, but if scale economies are important small banks will have to limit their activity to 
relational lending. Moreover, regulations that limit the credit that a bank can concentrate in a 
single borrower curtail small banks to lend to large borrowers because the size of the loan is 
expected to increase with the size of the borrower. 
In general, large firms are less opaque and informational simpler than small firms, in 
part because they tend to be older and have more accumulated trading experience. Small 
firms of high financial quality and low credit risk are likely to receive competitive loan offers 
from large banks with low operating costs9. Small borrowers of observable low credit quality 
may also have the opportunity to get involved in transactional lending with large banks, as 
long as the former are able to pledge easy to monitor collateral to secure the loan. Large and 
small but transparent firms are the borrowers more likely to be attracted by banks with 
transactional lending technologies. 
 Small firms without verifiable financial information, operating in local markets, 
physically and informational distant from the headquarters of a bank, become a segment of 
the credit market that can be left out of transactional lending. Small banks with low agency 
costs and low organizational diseconomies, but with potentially higher operating costs, have 
                                                                          
8. See also Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Boot and Thakor (2000). 
9. Hannan (1991), Berger and Udell (1996) and Berger et al. (2003) provide supporting evidence that large banks lend to 
small business at lower interest rates than small banks do. Berger and Udell (1996) for the US, Harhoff and Körting 
(1998) for Germany, and Jiménez et al. (2006) for Spain, also find that the use of collateral is less likely among large 
banks than among small banks. This can be interpreted as evidence that large banks use cheaper transactional lending 
technologies to deal with relatively high quality small firms. We do not have information on interest rates of loans to test 
for this evidence. 
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the opportunity to serve this segment of the market, investing in firm and product-market 
specific information and devoting resources to monitor the value of collateral. This soft 
information is generated mostly through contact over time between bank loan officers and the 
firm, so relational lending is implemented through long and, often, exclusive relationships 
between the borrower and the lender. 
The conclusion is that large banks will have lower market share than small banks in 
credit to small and medium size enterprises, SMEs, and larger market share than small banks 
in loans to large firms. If the size of the two markets, credit to opaque SMEs and credit to 
large firms and to transparent good quality small firms, are similar, large banks will have a 
lower proportion of loans to SMEs over total loans than small banks. The US empirical 
evidence supports this prediction [Berger et al. (1995), Berger and Udell (1996), Strahan and 
Weston (1996), Cole et al. (2004), Berger et al. (2002), and Brickley et al. (2003)]. The bank 
size specialization hypothesis is then summarized as follows. 
 H.1. The comparative advantage of large (small) banks in transactional (relational) 
lending will make more likely that large (small) banks lend to large (small) and informational 
simpler (opaque) borrowers. 
3.1  Ownership form of the bank and risk taking 
The payoffs of leveraged equity are equivalent to a call option on the assets of the firm [Black 
and Scholes (1973)]. The value of the option increases with volatility in the value of the firm, so 
decisions that increase volatility and leave unchanged the expected value of the total assets 
imply a transfer of wealth from debt holders, mainly depositors in the case of banks, to 
residual claimants [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. Banks are highly leveraged, thus, 
their incentives to risk taking behavior can be higher than in other less leveraged firms. 
But incentives can differ across bank ownership types if each form implies different 
alignment between interests of those who hold control rights and interests of residual 
claimants. Saunders et al. (1990) find that shareholder-controlled banks are riskier than 
manager-controlled banks because, in the former, residual claimants also hold decision 
rights. From the same reason, stock thrifts and stock insurance companies are expected to 
be riskier than mutual thrifts and mutual insurance companies [Esty (1997a and b), 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993), Lee et al. (1997)]. 
 Among Spanish banks, commercial banks are the ones with closer alignment 
between holders of control rights and residual claimants. Within commercial banks the 
alignment can be higher or lower depending upon the ownership structure of the commercial 
bank. Thus, banks under managers’ control will have lower incentives to perform risk shifting 
practices than shareholder-controlled banks, since the former have control rights but no 
residual claims10. 
Savings banks’ managers and workers have control rights far beyond their 
ownership rights, mainly because representatives of depositors, of founding institutions and of 
public authorities, the groups in charge of monitoring managerial decisions nominating 
board’s members, have neither the information nor the individual incentives (free riding 
behavior) to monitor managerial decisions and performance of the bank. To understand the 
risk taking behavior of the savings banks it is important to understand the incentives 
                                                                          
10. This is particularly true when the risk of bankruptcy is low. However, when the banking industry is in an “unhealthy” 
situation, Gorton and Rosen (1995) find that banks with entrenched managers make relatively riskier loans than 
shareholder-controlled banks. 
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of workers and managers. Most of their current income comes in the form of salary, 
pension and other job-related benefits. These are fixed claims that align the interests of 
workers and managers with those of the depositors or other debt holders, so the incentives 
to get involved in risk shifting can be expected to be very low. Another moderating factor of 
risk taking behavior by savings banks is the fact that they cannot issue equity to compensate 
losses and comply with the minimum regulatory capital. 
Individual borrowers of credit cooperatives can have incentives to free ride in taking 
risky loans, since the losses are shared by the rest of members of the mutual company. 
However, knowing this, the other partners have incentives to closely monitor risky loans and 
avoid unsound risk taking. Since very often borrowers are also depositors of the bank, any 
potential gain from risk shifting behavior has to be weighted against the loss in the value of 
deposits. Credit cooperatives lack experience in open market competition, because 
regulation restricted their credit to some market segments (i.e. relatively small farming 
cooperatives operating in rural areas). For this reason, credit cooperatives are likely to be 
highly specialized in loans to relatively small borrowers. Credit cooperatives should be more 
conservative than commercial banks. The managerial teams have high discretion in making 
decisions but they are not residual claimants, and their human capital is highly specific. 
In comparing the specialization of banks versus finance companies Carey 
et al. (1998) raise the issue of reputation concerns when lending to borrowers of different ex 
ante observable credit risk. Since ex post loan renegotiation between banks and firms is very 
frequent even among good quality borrowers, in lending to ex ante risky borrowers banks will 
weight the benefits with the damage in the reputation of being fair in the ex post negotiation, 
that could cause to be frequently involved in borrowers’ liquidations. If reputation factors differ 
across banks depending on their ownership form then some specialization is expected so 
that those forms that value reputation the most will tend to specialize in lower risk borrowers 
than those that value it less. 
Savings banks and credit cooperatives are expected to have higher reputation 
concerns than commercial banks. Hansmann (1996) argues that not-for-profit banks can be 
explained as a way to restore trust in banking markets, so not-for-profit savings banks rely on 
trust as one of their comparative advantages. Second, boards of savings banks are filled with 
representatives of local and regional communities, especially those banks that concentrate 
most of their activity in a local or regional market, together with workers’ representatives. 
Credit cooperatives are also mainly local banks.  Therefore, savings banks and cooperatives 
face higher social pressure to take into account community interests in their credit decisions 
than commercial banks. 
The public image of savings banks and credit cooperatives would be damaged, as 
well as their reputation of being gentle in loan renegotiations, if they frequently force 
borrowers into liquidation. Public authorities often claim that savings banks have, as one of 
their missions, to contribute to the economic development of the region where they have 
banking activity. 
Being aware of the reputation and social pressure concerns to stop lending to ex 
post observable low credit quality borrower, savings banks and credit cooperatives will try to 
limit their risk exposure ex ante, specializing in lower risk borrowers and/or will try to lower the 
incentives to moral hazard behavior of those borrowers that get a loan by asking more 
collateral. Therefore reputation and social pressure concerns increase the likelihood that loans 
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with collateral will more often be granted by saving banks and credit cooperatives than by 
commercial banks. 
H.2. Savings banks and credit cooperatives are less likely to lend to borrowers of ex 
ante low credit quality and more likely to lend to borrowers of observed low credit quality, for 
example those that have loans in default, than commercial banks. Savings banks and credit 
cooperatives are more likely to grant a collateralized loan than commercial banks. 
3.2 Size and ownership form 
A totally unexplored issue in the literature is the competitive advantage of using transactional 
or relational lending technologies by banks of equal size but different ownership forms. 
Spanish banking regulation put commercial, savings, and cooperative banks in a level playing 
field in 1989. Until then, savings banks had been banned to expand beyond certain 
geographic and industry boundaries and for a long time their credit policies were dictated by 
public authorities. After full liberalization, savings banks and cooperatives compete openly 
with commercial banks in all business segments. The final result, that it was difficult to predict 
years ago, has been a steady increase in market share in a profitable and solvent way. 
It can be expected that not-for-profit savings banks with loose property rights 
consequence of their unique ownership, will have lower operating efficiency than for-profit 
shareholders controlled banks, since managers and workers of these organizations do not 
face the supervision of profit motivated shareholders, as managers and workers of 
commercial banks do. But, at the same time, both forms of ownership are subject to strong 
product market competition and, after their geographical expansion savings banks compete 
among themselves in practically all local markets. Inefficient banks are forced out of the 
market, including savings banks for whom mergers with other savings banks is observed to 
be a more effective governance mechanism than in the case of commercial banks11. 
Savings banks are close to workers’ cooperatives in the sense that, together with 
managers, workers have almost absolute control over the assets of the bank. The bank 
provides life time employment, relatively high salaries and benefits, including retirement 
benefits and pensions, and high involvement in the management of the bank. Whatever the 
objectives of the organization might be (sound growth, higher wages and benefits per worker 
or higher profits to pay higher social dividend), one can believe that workers of savings banks 
are more motivated to pursue these objectives than workers of commercial banks (who work 
under more hierarchical structures, lower efficiency wages and higher risk of restructuring) are 
to maximize shareholders’ profits. 
Ownership form of the bank can imply differences in their respective organizational 
diseconomies, costs of delegated monitoring, and therefore, from H1, the likelihood of 
specialization in transactional or relational lending could be different across ownership forms 
of a given size. Looser property rights and potential conflicts between interested parties 
(workers and managers, public authorities, depositors, founding entities) in savings banks put 
them in comparative disadvantage relative to commercial banks in the use of relational 
lending technologies because they can derive into high control loss. On the other hand, if 
competition limits discretion of savings banks to deviate from profit maximization, and 
                                                                          
11. Crespi et al. (2004) find that savings banks that merge have worse performance before the merger than those that 
do not merge. The propensity to merge for low performing savings banks is higher than for low performing commercial 
banks. On the other hand, the propensity of management and directors to leave the low performing banks is higher 
among commercial banks than among savings banks. 
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efficiency wages, specific human capital and worker participation lower their agency costs 
compared with those in commercial banks, then relational lending will be more likely in 
savings banks than in commercial banks. 
Given the conflicting arguments, we formulate the hypothesis to be tested as if there 
is no difference in the size specialization hypothesis, H1, across ownership forms: 
H.3. The size of the bank/size of the borrower specialization is the same across 
ownership forms. 
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4 Variables and methodology 
To test the hypotheses listed above we randomly select a stratified representative sample of 
loans out of the population of new loans to business firms. The stratification criteria are based 
on some variables used for the multivariate analysis, such as year, region, bank size classes 
and form of ownership, collateral, maturity, industry, etc. The final selected sample is 
around 10% of the total population (number and amount) of new loans to non-financial firms. 
 The dependent variable, Type of lender, is the choice of size and ownership of the 
lender for each loan granted to non-financial firms by Spanish banks every year from 1996 
to 2003. Banks are grouped in size classes and ownership forms as reported in section 2. A 
closer look at the data reveals that in the group of small banks practically all of them are 
commercial banks. All the cooperatives concentrate in the medium size class, while savings 
banks are distributed in the size classes medium and large. Commercial banks are in all 
size classes and are the only ones included among very large banks. Type of lender is, 
thus, divided into seven classes. Class 1 includes small commercial banks, Class 2 medium 
commercial banks, Class 3 large commercial banks, Class 4 very large commercial 
banks, Class 5 medium savings banks, Class 6 large savings banks, and Class 7 medium 
cooperatives. 
Size of the borrower and Size of the loan approximate the information complexity 
of the borrower. Size of the borrower is measured by the total bank debt of the borrower 
when the loan is granted12. Larger borrowers are better suited to be served by banks that 
specialize in transactional lending (i.e. large banks). Size of the loan is equal to the disposable 
value of the loan when it is granted. 
Collateral takes the value of 1 if the loan is granted with collateral and 0 otherwise. 
Empirical evidence associates the use of collateral with borrowers of lower credit 
quality [Berger and Udell (1990), Jiménez et al. (2005)]. If banks with transactional lending 
technologies specialize in transparent and high quality borrowers, then we expect to find 
fewer banks with transactional lending technologies, large banks, in loans with collateral. 
Longer maturity implies more informational complex loans and, in general, higher risk for the 
lender. Long Term, that takes the value of 1 if the loan has maturity of five years or more 
and 0 otherwise. Controlling for the variable Collateral, we assume that Long Term loans are 
more informational complex and riskier than the rest of loans. 
Under their request, the CIR informs banks about the current default status of their 
potential new borrowers. Borrowers of observed low credit quality at the time they receive a 
loan include those that have at least a loan in default at the time they receive a new one. The 
dummy variable Defaultt-1 (ex ante default) takes the value of 1 for those borrowers that get a 
loan being in default of previous ones, and 0 otherwise. We interpret that banks more willing 
to lend to borrowers with loans in default are also the banks more concerned with reputation 
or social pressure considerations. 
Defaultt+1 (ex post default) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for borrowers that 
default a year after they get the loan, not having defaulted the year before, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                          
12. When the current loan is the first one, size of the borrower is set to 1 to avoid problems with the log transformation 
we use in the regression. 
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We assume that banks estimate a probability of ex post default for each borrower that gets a 
loan. To be among the banks that are more likely to lend to borrowers that default a year after 
will be interpreted as evidence that the bank is more willing to lend to borrowers of ex ante 
estimated higher risk using standard risk evaluation methods (for example, scoring from 
accounting ratios). 
Several control variables account for other factors that can condition the 
specialization decision. The choice of the lender can be affected by the inclination of 
the borrower to stay loyal to a bank or to work with several banks at the same time. The 
control variable used in the empirical analysis is the Share of Main Bank, the proportion of 
total loans of the borrower granted by the largest lender, at the time the new loan is granted. 
The specialization decision can also be affected by the interest rate of the loan. We 
do not observe the interest rate of the individual loan but we have data on interest rates 
charged by each bank in new loans to non-financial firms every year of the period. The 
variable Interest rate is equal to the average interest rate of all new business loans granted by 
a bank in a given year. The variable will take the same value for all loans granted by a bank in 
a given year, so it will control for bank specific factors common to all loans in the year. 
Differences in interest rates across banks can reflect different credit policies and when we 
compare risk taking behavior across banks the interest rate variable will control for differences 
in price behind the risk taking in a particular loan decision. Since the average interest rate 
charged by a particular bank can vary over time the variable controls for differences in policies 
across banks in a particular year but it allows for possible changes in policy over time. 
Other controls are dummy variables for industry, region and time. Non-financial firms 
are classified in seven different industries13 which differ in credit risk because business 
opportunities are different depending on competition, growth and level of technological 
innovation. They will also differ in the value and easy to monitor of internal collateral. For 
instance, Mining and Manufacturing is expected to be riskier and with more informational 
complex assets than Utilities, but precise differences are difficult to establish for all industries. 
Local market conditions are measured by 17 dummy variables, Region. Year controls for 
changes in external conditions over time. 
Table 6, Panel A (ownership forms) and Panel B (size classes) present descriptive 
statistics of the variables of the model. Commercial and savings banks have similar average 
sizes, around € 10,000 million, while average size of cooperatives is ten times lower. The 
average size of borrowers from commercial and savings banks is similar and three times 
larger than those that borrow from cooperatives. However, median size of borrowers in 
savings banks and cooperatives are close. Panel A also shows that savings banks and 
cooperatives have higher proportions of long term (44% and 41%, respectively) and 
collateralized loans (35% and 27%) than commercial banks (18% and 27%). Risk taking 
behavior is similar across ownership forms in both ex ante and ex post credit quality 
measures. This last result contrast with [(Esty (1997a and b)] for thrifts or with Lamm-Tenant 
and Starks (1993) for stock and mutual insurance companies, who find that banks and 
insurance companies with stock ownership take more risk in their investments that banks and 
insurance companies under mutual ownership. Borrowers that get loans from commercial 
banks borrow, on average, 72.3% from their main bank, while borrowers from savings banks 
borrow 79% and cooperatives 80.8%. Although borrowing is highly concentrated, the 
                                                                          
13. Agriculture and fishing; mining and manufacturing; utilities; construction and real estate; trade, leisure, transport and 
communications; computer services, R&D and other business services; and other industries. 
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concentration is lower among commercial banks than for the rest of ownership forms, in 
particular, in median values. Interest rates are lower for savings banks and higher for 
cooperatives. 
Table 6, Panel B presents similar descriptive statistics than those of Panel A, but 
now banks are classified according to size. Moving from lower to higher size classes we 
observe that the average size of borrowers and loans increase in parallel. A larger size of 
banks also tends to imply a higher proportion of loans with collateral and a higher proportion 
of long term loans, except for the very large banks (Size 4). However, among size classes 2, 3 
and 4 the means of the former two variables are close, so only significant differences are 
detected relative to small banks. The proportions of loans granted to borrowers that default 
in t-1 or t+1 are similar across size classes while the share of total loans granted to borrowers 
by their respective main bank decreases, in average, with the size of the bank. On the other 
hand, smaller banks tend to charge significantly higher interest rates than the rest of banks. In 
fact, average and median interest rates decline monotonically as the size of the bank 
increases. 
4.1 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses of bank specialization, we estimate a multinomial logit model, 
Type of Lender = F(Size of the borrower, Size of the loan, Collateral, Long term, 
Defaultt-1, Defaultt+1, Share of main bank, Interest rate, Industry, Region, Year) (1) 
Model (1) will give the likelihood of a choice of a particular type of lender, relative to 
the choice of a type of lender that is chosen as reference group. If the omitted group is small 
commercial banks (Class 1), then a positive and significant coefficient for the explanatory 
variable in Class 3 (large commercial banks) means that the likelihood that the loan is granted 
by a large commercial bank increases as the explanatory variable also increases. 
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5 Results 
The results of the multinomial logit estimations are presented in Table 7.  Model 1, presents 
the estimation of (1) only with control variables (Share of the main bank, Interest, Time, 
Industry and Region) as explanatory factors of the choice of lender. Model 2, presents the 
estimation with control variables and variables that refer only to characteristics of the 
borrower. Model 3 shows the estimation with all explanatory variables except Interest rate; 
Model 3 will provide evidence of the importance of banks’ specific effects in the specialization 
decision. Finally, Model 4 shows the multinomial logit estimation of the full model while the last 
column of the table shows the relative likelihood of choosing each form of size-ownership for 
a given change in the values of the explanatory variables from Model 414. 
The hypothesis of no specialization at all considers that differences in the likelihood 
of choosing one class of lender or the other can be explained by time invariant effects, such 
as economic conditions of the borrowers’ market, captured by Industry and Region, by 
relational lending practices, Share of the Main Bank, by bank credit policies, Interest rate, and 
by time varying shocks common to all market participants, captured by Time. This is 
equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 
other than the control variables, are equal to zero. The likelihood ratio of estimating model (1) 
with this restriction on the coefficients is LR = 691.54, with p-value 0.000. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of no specialization is rejected. 
Second, we test the hypothesis that specialization responds only to the ownership 
form of the bank dimension, and that it responds only to the size dimension. The first one 
implies a null hypothesis that the parameters corresponding to Class 1 to 4 are equal, and 
also those of Class 5 and 6. With these restrictions, the choice model is reduced to three 
alternatives: commercial banks, savings banks and cooperatives. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis that there is no bank specialization along the size dimension implies that the 
parameters of Class 2 equal those of Class 5 and 7, and that parameters of Class 3 equal 
those of Class 6. After these restrictions the choice set is reduced to four size alternatives. 
The respective statistics from these restrictions are χ2 (148) = 90,806.75, p-value = 0.000, 
only size specialization, and χ2(111) = 62,398.72, p-value = 0.000, only ownership form 
specialization. Therefore, the two restrictions are rejected at high levels of statistical 
significance and the conclusion is that banks specialize in an interrelated way along the two 
dimensions of size and ownership form. This implies that the analysis of lender choice should 
be carried out jointly along size and ownership dimensions, otherwise the analysis might be 
incomplete or even biased. 
 To add only borrower-related variables among the explanatory variables (Model 2), 
in addition to the control variables, marginally increases the R2 of the multivariate analysis. 
R2 is higher when loan related variables are added to the list of explanatory variables 
(Model 4). Bank specific effects contribute in a significant way to the explanatory power of the 
model: when Interest rate is excluded (Model 3) the R2 is almost half the value it is in Model 4. 
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Model 2 estimates are quite similar to Model 4. The only difference worth mention is 
that in Model 2 the coefficient of the variable Size of the borrower in class 4 is higher than in 
the rest of classes but in Model 4 the coefficient is lower than the coefficient of the variable in 
classes 2 and 3. That is, in Model 2 the result that large banks specialize in large borrowers is 
not rejected among commercial banks, but in Model 4 the result breaks down when we reach 
the class of very large banks. To control for loan characteristics, in particular size, can change 
the conclusions about the size of borrower specialization by banks. 
When we control for bank specific effects with the Interest rate variable (Model 4), the 
absolute value of the estimated coefficients of the multinomial model are lower than otherwise 
(Model 3). This is true specially for the coefficients of Size of the loan. Moreover, in Model 4 
some of the coefficients are no longer statistically significant. Interest rates in loans to 
non-financial firms are jointly determined with other loan characteristics such as size, collateral 
and maturity, thus, these attributes are not independent of the interest rate of the loan. If 
Interest rate is excluded, the loan related variables capture some of the effects of the price in 
the specialization decision and the estimated parameters of the loan attributes are biased. For 
example, if size of the loan is negatively correlated with the interest rate of the loan15, then the 
evidence of strong specialization in small loans by small commercial banks that we observe in 
Model 3 is due to the fact that small commercial banks are also the banks that charge higher 
interest rate in average. After Interest rate is included, we observe the true effect of Size of the 
loan in the specialization decision, and among commercial banks only the very large (class 4) 
appear to specialize in large loans. The exposition below will focus on the results of Model 4, 
together with the column of relative marginal effects. 
5.1 Size-transactional lending specialization 
Medium size, large and very large commercial banks are more likely to lend to larger 
borrowers than small banks since the coefficient of Size of the borrower is positive and 
statistically significant in classes 2, 3, and 4 (small commercial banks is the omitted class). 
The coefficient of this variable is higher in class 3 than in class 2 (the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients is rejected at the 1% level16), which would be consistent with the prediction that 
as banks increase in size, they are more likely to specialize in larger borrowers for which 
transactional lending is a more effective technology (H.1). However, in class 4 (very large 
banks) the coefficient of Size of the borrower is slightly lower than that in class 2 (the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients is not rejected). 
The relative marginal effects (column 5 in Table 7) tell us that a 10 % increase in the 
size of the borrowing firm, with respect to its sample mean, increases the likelihood that the 
loan will be granted by banks in class 2 by 9.64%, also with respect to the mean sample 
probability of granting a loan by banks in class 2. The same sensitivity analysis for class 3, 
large commercial banks, gives an increase in the likelihood of 23%.  Among very large banks, 
the likelihood increases only 1%. Therefore, the relationship between size of the borrower and 
size of the bank is supported as long as we consider the effect of increases in the former in 
the likelihood that a loan is granted by a small, medium and large commercial bank, but 
breaks down when we move from large to very large commercial banks. However, very large 
                                                                          
15. Lower quality borrowers with relatively higher credit risk are more frequent among small and short term loans than 
among large and long term loans.  Higher risk will go together with  higher interest rate. So, banks that charge higher 
interest rates are more likely to grant relatively smaller loans than banks with lower interest rates. Controlling for 
differences in interest rates we isolate the size of the loan specialization effect from the quality of the borrower effect. 
16. We have performed pair-wise tests of statistical differences between estimated coefficients across size and 
ownership classes. The resulting statistics are not reported to save space but, unless indicated otherwise, all differences 
between estimated coefficients mentioned in this section are statistically different, at least at the 5%. 
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banks are those more likely to grant larger loans: a 10% increase in the size of the loan 
increases the likelihood that the loan will be granted by very large banks by 76%, compared 
with a reduction of 24.6% in the likelihood that it will be granted by a large commercial bank. 
Not controlling for characteristics of the loan, column 2, the conclusion would have 
been that, among commercial banks, larger borrowers get loans from larger banks. When 
account is taken that larger borrowers will also get larger loans, the conclusion is that very 
large banks are the banks more likely to grant the larger loans but not so much those more 
likely to lend to larger borrowers. The comparative advantage of very large banks seems to be 
in large loans, probably because they are the class of banks for whom the regulatory risk 
concentration constraint is less binding. 
Among commercial banks, if the loan has collateral the likelihood that it will be 
granted by a medium or large bank is lower than if the loan is granted by a small bank or a 
very large bank. The coefficients of Collateral are negative in classes 2 and 3 and higher in 
absolute terms for large banks than for medium banks. The relative marginal effects reinforce 
this conclusion. The likelihood that a loan granted by a medium or large bank among 
collateralized loans is 23.8% and 57.8% lower compared with that in non collateralized loans, 
respectively. If the use of collateral is evidence of informational complex borrowers, then the 
results are partially consistent with the prediction that larger banks specialize in informational 
simple borrowers because these are the borrowers more suitable for transactional lending. 
The exception appears to be very large banks which, according to the empirical results, 
specialize relatively more on opaque borrowers who pledge collateral to obtain a loan. 
The evidence of a positive effect of the variables Size of the borrower/Size of the loan 
in the likelihood that a loan will be granted by a larger commercial bank, and the evidence that 
up to large commercial banks the likelihood that a loan is granted by a larger size bank is 
lower for collateralized loans give broad support to hypothesis H1: larger banks tent to 
specialize more than smaller ones in transactional lending. In the group of very large banks 
this is only true when Size of the loan substitutes Size of the borrower. 
In classes 5 and 6, medium and large savings banks respectively, the coefficient of 
Size of the borrower is also positive, meaning that larger borrowers are more likely to get 
loans from medium and large saving banks than from small commercial banks. But now the 
estimated coefficient for this variable is significantly smaller for large savings banks. Moreover, 
large savings banks specialize relatively more in smaller loans than medium size ones. 
Therefore, among savings banks the hypothesis that Size of the borrower/Size of the Loan is 
positively associated with size of the bank, is not supported by the data. The variable 
Collateral has a positive coefficient in the classes 5 and 6 but both coefficients are not 
statistically different from zero. 
The test of the size specialization hypothesis gives opposite results in savings 
banks than in commercial banks. The difference in the coefficient of Size of the borrower 
between large and medium commercial banks is 0.013 (0.11 - 0.097), while the same 
difference in savings banks is -0.008 (0.072-0.080). In terms of relative marginal effects, an 
increase of 10% in the size of the borrower, with respect to the sample mean, decreases 
twice the relative likelihood that the loan will be granted by a large savings bank, compared 
with the decrease in the likelihood of being granted by a small savings bank (-15.5% 
versus -7.4%). The same change of size of borrower in commercial banks implies a 23% 
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increase in the likelihood that the loan will be granted by a large bank and only an increase 
of 9.6% in the likelihood of being granted by a small bank. 
In commercial banks the evidence is broadly in favor of the hypothesis that large 
banks specialize in transactional lending and small ones in relational lending while large 
savings banks tend to specialize more in relational lending than medium size ones. The test of 
the size of the borrower/size of the bank specialization hypothesis gives different results 
depending on ownership form. Therefore, hypothesys H3 does not hold. The evidence that an 
increase in the size of the bank raises the likelihood of lending to small borrowers among 
savings banks and decreases it among commercial banks suggests that organizational 
diseconomies for relational lending are less severe among savings banks, besides their loose 
property rights. 
5.2 Ownership form specialization  
Large and very large commercial banks are more likely to lend to riskier borrowers than 
small banks. The likelihood of granting a loan to borrowers that default after they receive the 
loan, Defaultt+1 = 1, compared with the likelihood in the group of borrowers with no defaults, 
is 19.2% lower in the group of medium size commercial banks and 6.7%  (7.4%) higher in the 
group of large (very large) commercial banks. Since large and very large commercial banks 
are more likely to be management controlled than small and medium size ones, this evidence 
is not consistent with the risk shifting hypothesis. The same conclusion is reached, in the 
sense of lower likelihood of lending to borrowers of ex post estimated high risk, when we 
compare the relative marginal effect of Default t+1 for medium size commercial banks with 
the relative marginal effect in saving banks of that size. In other words, the likelihood of 
lending to ex post riskier borrowers is lower among those banks which can be expected to be 
under close shareholders’ control, the opposite to what it would be expected from risk 
shifting behavior. 
Savings banks of medium size have higher estimated coefficient and higher relative 
marginal effect for Defaultt-1 than other size and ownership classes. In the group of borrowers 
that have a loan in default when they get a new one, the difference in the likelihood that a loan 
is granted by a medium size savings bank with respect to the likelihood of being granted by a 
medium size commercial bank is 54.5% [22.6-(-31.9)] higher than in the group of borrowers 
with no loans in default. A similar case occurs with cooperatives, although the marginal 
impact is much lower. Large savings banks show very similar coefficients for Defaultt-1 
although neither of them is significant. 
Within the same size class, use of collateral in loans implies an increase in the 
likelihood that the loan will be granted by a savings bank and a decrease in the likelihood that 
it will be made by a commercial bank. The differences are highly significant as the relative 
marginal effect indicates for commercial banks. Within the same size class, cooperatives 
grant relatively more collateralized loans than commercial banks, while they are similar to 
savings banks17. 
The variable Long term shows higher coefficients for cooperatives and savings banks 
than in commercial banks. Thus savings banks and cooperatives specialize relatively more 
than commercial banks in long term loans. Maybe the higher trustworthiness of the former 
                                                                          
17. Note that even if the collateral variable is not significant for savings banks and cooperatives, the comparison with 
commercial banks is totally meaningful. 
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give them a comparative advantage to be involved in long term contracts that likely will involve 
renegotiations along the life of the loan. 
The evidence regarding ex ante credit risk, collateral and maturity is consistent with 
reputation effects in lending specialization given that the main differences in the likelihood to 
lend to borrowers of lower ex ante credit quality occur in the group of medium size savings 
banks as well as in the group of credit cooperatives. Both types of banks are the ones that 
have closer ties with local communities and, therefore, might be subject to higher social 
pressure and potential political interference18. In addition, the statistical and economic 
differences in the likelihood of lending between savings and commercial banks of equal 
size when Defaultt+1 = 0 and when Defaultt+1 = 1, are much lower than with the variable of ex 
ante observed default. Consistently with the reputational argument, both types of banks use 
more collateral than medium commercial banks, as an effective way to restrain moral hazard 
or, as a last resort for minimizing the potencial damage from the borrower. All in all, there 
seems to be some support for H.2. 
 Savings banks and, specially, credit cooperatives specialize in small borrowers 
relatively more than commercial banks of equal size do. This conclusion comes from the 
comparison of estimated coefficients of classes 2, 5 and 7 (medium size banks of each 
ownership form), and of classes 3 and 6 (large commercial banks and large savings banks). In 
cooperatives (medium savings banks), an increase in the size of the borrower of 10% from the 
sample mean implies a 47% (7.4%) lower likelihood of granting a loan. In medium size 
commercial banks the relative marginal effect of the size of the borrower is 9.6%. While large 
commercial banks increase the likelihood of granting a loan in 23%, large savings banks 
decrease their likelihood in 15.5%, under similar change in size of the borrower. 
The empirical results are completed with Table 8 that shows the multinomial logit 
estimation collapsing the size classes and limiting the choices to the ownership form of the 
bank. The results are intended to provide a summary evidence of the ownership specialization 
among Spanish banks. The model includes the Size of the bank, measured in terms of total 
loans (in logs) in the balance sheet of the bank in year t. The group excluded as reference 
group is commercial banks, so we compare specialization of savings banks, class 2, and 
cooperatives, class 3, relative to that of commercial banks. 
The likelihood that the loan is granted by a savings bank or by a credit cooperative 
decreases as the size of the borrower and/or the size of the loan increases (both variables are 
negative and statistically significant). If the loan is granted by a large bank, the likelihood of 
that being done by a savings bank or by a credit cooperative is lower, specially in 
cooperatives, than the likelihood of being granted by a commercial bank. This is consistent 
with the fact that among very large banks there are only commercial banks. The variables that 
test for possible reputation concerns, Default t-1 and Collateral have the expected sign, that is, 
savings banks would be more concerned with reputation effects than commercial banks. The 
positive and significant coefficient for Share of the main bank indicates that relational lending 
is more determinant of the lender choice among savings banks and cooperatives than among 
commercial banks. Finally, the negative coefficient of Interest rate indicates that the share of 
loans granted by savings banks and cooperatives is higher among banks of lower average 
interest rates. 
                                                                          
18. For very large banks the positive and significant coefficient for defalutt-1 might be the result of their relatively higher 
especialization in more opaque firms, already mentioned. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the specialization of Spanish banks in 
lending to non-financial firms. We explain individual loan granting decisions of lenders 
grouped in classes according to size and ownership of banks during the period 1996-2003, 
as a function of the characteristics of the borrowers (size, credit risk, industry, region and 
strength of the borrower-lender relation), and loans (size, collateral and maturity), and 
controlling for average interest rates of bank loans. 
We find evidence in favor of transactional lending specialization of large commercial 
banks compared with smaller ones. For this form of ownership, the likelihood of choosing a 
larger bank increases with the size of the borrower up to the class of very large banks. The 
transactional lending specialization of large banks is confirmed by the lower likelihood that 
these banks grant loans with collateral, presumably used in loans to more opaque borrowers. 
However, very large commercial banks depart from this pattern since they show a 
specialization model that does not fit well with existing theories and would deserve closer 
attention. The only clear result is that they specialize in larger loans more than the rest of 
banks. 
Among savings banks, large ones are more likely to lend to small borrowers and 
equally likely to lend with collateral than medium size ones. Within a given size class, savings 
banks and cooperatives are more likely to specialize in relational lending than commercial 
banks. These results are consistent with the reality of lower organizational diseconomies in 
savings banks than in commercial banks. Apparently, the potential negative effect on 
organizational efficiency of loose property rights in not-for-profit stakeholders oriented savings 
banks, is more than compensated by efficiency pressures coming from product market 
competition and lower agency costs from managers/workers effective control of the 
organizational resources. The apparent efficiency of large savings banks in lending to smaller 
borrowers can be a possible explanation of why in Spain the size of the bank/size of the 
borrower specialization is not so pronounced in aggregated terms, as it is found in the US. 
There is no clear evidence of risk shifting behavior in Spanish general intermediaries, 
in the sense that lending to borrowers of lower credit quality does not show a pattern 
consistent with the prediction that shareholder controlled banks will be more likely to make 
riskier loans to capture rents from depositors (and from the rest of the banks under deposits 
guarantees). Regulation and supervision of banks seems to be effective in preventing this 
behavior. Medium size savings banks and credit cooperatives lend in relatively higher 
proportion to borrowers of observed low credit quality at the time of granting the loan and 
show higher likelihood of collateralized lending than commercial banks of equal size. We 
interpret this evidence as the result of reputation and social pressure considerations that 
affect mainly to those banks with closer ties with their local communities. 
The relative specialization in relational lending of savings banks and cooperatives, 
which hold almost half of the market share in new loans to non-financial firms, assures the 
availability of credit to small and medium size, more opaque, firms, even if consolidation of 
large commercial banks implies a shift towards more specialization in transactional lending. 
The current situation of credit availability for firms that depend on relational lending can 
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continue after Basel II comes into effect, when large banks might find stronger incentives to 
deepen their transactional lending specialization. 
In Spanish credit markets, ownership diversity has significantly increased in recent 
years, during a period low real interest rates, low profit margins and intense competition. This 
paper explains that increase by the fact that savings banks, contrary to what it could be 
expected given their loose property rights, have equal or lower organizational diseconomies 
than commercial banks. This, together with higher trustworthiness and close ties with local 
communities gives them a comparative advantage in long term loans, those that increase the 
most during the period of study. 
One important conclusion from this study is that the link between ownership form 
and performance can be more complex than it is usually considered. Spanish savings banks 
offer an interesting example of a non conventional institutional form that can take advantage 
of the scale economies of size in production without suffering with the same intensity as 
commercial banks do the organizational diseconomies of size. 
Our paper also shows that specialization in lending to non-financial firms goes 
beyond the differences in lending policies between general intermediaries and special 
intermediaries due to reputation concerns observed by Carey et al. (1998) and beyond the 
size of the bank effect in the choice between transactional or relational lending technologies 
observed by Berger and Udell (2002). Within general intermediaries we also observe that 
diversity of organizational forms, such as savings banks, credit cooperatives and commercial 
banks, go together with specialization that crosses the dimensions of reputation and size. For 
example, within saving banks, the large ones specialize more than the medium size ones in 
lending to small borrowers, while they seem to be not so strongly affected by reputation 
considerations as medium size saving banks seem to be. 
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Table 1. Breakdown of the population of new loans to non-financial 
firms granted by Spanish banks by loan size, borrower size and bank 
size. 1996-2003. All size brackets correspond to 2003 values. For 
previous years, inflation rates are taken into account. 
Panel A. Loans 
 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for loans: 1: less than € 25 thousand; 2: more than € 25 thousand and less than € 100 thousand; 3: more than € 100 thousand 
and less than € 2 million;  4: more than € 2 million. 
Panel B. Borrowers 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for borrowers: 1- less than € 100 thousand; 2- more than € 100 thousand and less than € 1 million; 3- more than € 1 million  
and less than € 20 million; 4- more than € 20 million 
Panel C. Banks 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for banks: 1- less than € 1,000 million; 2- more than € 1,000 million and less than € 25,000 million; 3- more than € 25,000 million;
 4- banks involved in mega-mergers above € 25,000 million 
 
No. of loans (%) Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
1996 40.3 33.1 25.0 1.6 186,147 2.4 7.2 36.2 54.2 36,238,512
1997 34.7 35.3 28.2 1.7 206,087 2.0 7.3 38.4 52.2 42,638,235
1998 33.9 34.7 29.5 1.9 220,500 1.8 6.6 38.1 53.5 50,053,783
1999 33.7 36.9 27.6 1.8 299,116 1.8 7.4 38.4 52.4 66,631,646
2000 32.8 36.1 29.0 2.1 315,798 1.6 6.4 37.6 54.4 78,852,473
2001 33.3 35.3 28.9 2.5 321,482 1.5 5.7 34.4 58.4 95,012,263
2002 33.4 34.1 29.9 2.6 323,043 1.4 5.4 35.2 58.0 101,212,480
2003 31.5 34.9 31.1 2.5 400,789 1.4 5.7 36.5 56.4 127,934,614
Mean 33.7 35.1 29.0 2.2 2,272,962 1.6 6.2 36.6 55.6 598,574,006
Loan size Loan size
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
1996 46.1 42.8 10.6 0.6 139,768 4.0 18.4 31.6 46.0 36,238,512
1997 42.9 45.6 11.0 0.5 153,669 3.8 19.9 33.9 42.4 42,638,235
1998 41.3 46.5 11.7 0.6 163,874 3.3 18.9 35.1 42.7 50,053,783
1999 42.2 45.7 11.5 0.6 206,883 3.4 19.0 36.5 41.1 66,631,646
2000 40.6 46.7 12.1 0.6 218,602 2.9 18.0 37.3 41.8 78,852,473
2001 41.1 45.7 12.5 0.7 225,881 2.6 16.1 36.6 44.6 95,012,263
2002 39.6 46.7 13.0 0.7 227,727 2.5 16.6 38.7 42.2 101,212,480
2003 39.4 47.2 12.7 0.7 273,355 2.6 17.7 38.5 41.2 127,934,614
Mean 41.3 46.1 12.0 0.6 1,609,759 2.9 17.7 36.8 42.5 598,574,006
Borrower size Borrower size
No. of banks Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
1996 170 98 3 6 277 7.7 50.4 17.3 24.6 36,238,512
1997 163 100 4 7 274 6.3 49.9 20.0 23.8 42,638,235
1998 144 105 5 6 260 4.6 47.7 25.1 22.7 50,053,783
1999 123 114 8 4 249 3.0 44.8 32.4 19.8 66,631,646
2000 114 111 8 2 235 2.5 45.6 30.7 21.2 78,852,473
2001 107 111 10 2 230 1.7 43.5 35.8 19.0 95,012,263
2002 100 110 11 2 223 2.1 42.9 38.4 16.6 101,212,480
2003 95 103 12 2 212 1.8 38.4 45.2 14.7 127,934,614
3.0 43.9 34.1 19.0 598,574,006
Entity size Entity size
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0606 
Table 2. Market share by size of institution and size of borrowers. 
Population of new loans to non-financial firms granted by Spanish 
banks. 1996-2003. All size brackets correspond to 2003 values. For 
previous years, inflation rates are taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for borrowers: 1- less than € 100 thousand; 2- more than € 100 thousand and less than € 1,000 thousand; 3- more than 
€ 1,000 thousand and less than € 20 million; 4- more than € 20 million 
Breakdown for banks: 1- less than € 1,000 million; 2- more than € 1,000 million and less than € 25,000 million; 3- more than € 25,000 million; 
4- banks involved in mega-mergers above € 25,000 million 
No. of loans (%) Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
1
1996 8.5 7.3 5.8 10.2 7.6 8.1 6.7 5.5 9.5 7.7
1997 8.4 6.7 5.0 9.3 7.0 7.7 6.0 4.5 7.8 6.3
1998 7.7 6.4 4.3 5.8 6.4 7.0 5.6 3.6 4.8 4.6
1999 4.7 3.8 2.5 3.6 3.9 4.4 3.8 2.5 2.9 3.0
2000 4.0 3.5 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.9 3.7 2.6 1.8 2.5
2001 3.3 2.8 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.1 2.8 1.4 1.5 1.7
2002 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.6 2.4 2.1
2003 1.8 1.8 1.3 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.4 2.0 1.8
2
1996 59.7 58.7 56.2 52.4 58.5 58.8 58.3 53.8 44.3 50.4
1997 52.1 51.0 50.8 53.9 51.4 52.4 51.7 52.6 46.6 49.9
1998 51.2 50.7 50.0 52.5 50.8 52.1 52.3 52.2 41.6 47.7
1999 46.1 43.8 44.2 53.6 44.9 47.0 45.5 46.6 42.6 44.8
2000 42.5 40.9 40.1 52.0 41.5 43.3 42.5 45.4 47.2 45.6
2001 40.3 40.5 40.3 48.7 40.6 41.2 41.7 43.1 44.6 43.5
2002 45.0 44.1 43.0 47.9 44.2 44.5 43.4 43.8 41.8 42.9
2003 37.6 36.5 36.0 43.3 36.9 36.8 37.2 40.4 37.0 38.4
3
1996 16.6 15.2 14.6 17.6 15.7 17.6 15.2 14.5 20.0 17.3
1997 23.3 22.7 20.2 17.7 22.4 23.8 22.7 18.3 19.8 20.0
1998 25.6 23.7 21.6 22.1 23.9 25.2 22.9 19.2 30.8 25.1
1999 36.1 36.2 33.3 25.5 35.4 34.7 33.4 29.6 34.3 32.4
2000 39.1 37.8 35.4 29.2 37.5 37.3 34.6 30.9 28.5 30.7
2001 44.3 41.8 39.7 35.7 42.0 42.6 38.9 35.1 34.8 35.8
2002 44.2 43.3 42.3 39.4 43.3 44.2 41.3 37.9 37.4 38.4
2003 51.0 49.7 48.1 44.0 49.6 50.6 46.3 41.7 47.5 45.2
4
1996 15.2 18.8 23.4 19.7 18.2 15.6 19.8 26.2 26.2 24.6
1997 16.2 19.7 24.0 19.1 19.2 16.1 19.6 24.6 25.8 23.8
1998 15.5 19.3 24.0 19.6 18.9 15.7 19.3 25.0 22.8 22.7
1999 13.1 16.1 20.0 17.2 15.9 13.9 17.3 21.2 20.2 19.8
2000 14.4 17.8 21.9 16.0 17.5 15.5 19.2 21.1 22.5 21.2
2001 12.1 15.0 18.3 13.5 14.6 13.2 16.6 20.4 19.1 19.0
2002 8.0 10.2 13.0 10.5 10.0 8.8 12.9 16.7 18.3 16.6
2003 9.6 12.0 14.7 10.5 11.8 10.9 14.4 16.5 13.4 14.7
Borrower size Borrower size
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Table 3. Size breakdown for every size of institution by borrowers 
size. Population of new loans to non-financial firms granted by 
Spanish banks. 1996-2003. All size brackets correspond to 2003 
values. For previous years, inflation rates are taken into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for borrowers: 1- less than € 100 thousand; 2- more than € 100 thousand and less than € 1,000 thousand; 3- more than 
€ 1,000 thousand and less than € 20 million; 4- more than € 20 million 
Breakdown for banks: 1- less than € 1,000 million; 2- more than € 1,000 million and less than € 25,000 million; 3- more than € 25,000 million; 
4- banks involved in mega-mergers above € 25,000 million 
No. of loans (%) Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
1
1996 42.6 42.2 12.2 3.0 14,080 4.2 16.1 22.5 57.2 2,785,077
1997 41.5 43.8 11.9 2.8 14,489 4.6 18.9 24.1 52.4 2,692,691
1998 39.7 46.4 11.9 2.0 14,217 5.0 22.9 27.2 44.8 2,294,776
1999 39.9 46.2 12.0 2.0 11,530 5.0 23.9 30.7 40.4 1,987,364
2000 36.1 48.2 13.8 1.8 10,994 4.5 26.7 39.1 29.7 1,976,529
2001 38.4 47.7 12.0 1.9 8,751 4.7 26.3 30.1 38.9 1,617,868
2002 36.2 48.0 13.6 2.1 7,717 3.1 18.4 29.0 49.5 2,097,793
2003 32.3 49.8 14.6 3.3 6,753 2.5 20.6 30.1 46.7 2,269,997
2
1996 38.9 44.0 15.1 2.0 108,985 4.6 21.3 33.7 40.4 18,276,713
1997 35.3 45.9 16.5 2.2 105,893 4.0 20.6 35.8 39.6 21,257,864
1998 33.6 46.7 17.4 2.3 111,928 3.6 20.7 38.5 37.3 23,872,840
1999 33.9 45.6 18.0 2.5 134,197 3.5 19.3 38.1 39.1 29,829,514
2000 32.2 46.7 18.4 2.8 130,998 2.7 16.8 37.1 43.4 35,933,683
2001 31.9 46.0 19.1 3.0 130,494 2.5 15.4 36.3 45.8 41,302,088
2002 31.6 46.9 18.9 2.6 142,940 2.6 16.8 39.5 41.1 43,456,621
2003 30.8 47.4 18.9 2.9 147,895 2.5 17.2 40.5 39.8 49,070,625
3
1996 40.3 42.5 14.7 2.5 29,235 4.0 16.2 26.4 53.3 6,265,622
1997 36.4 46.9 15.1 1.7 46,147 4.5 22.6 31.0 42.0 8,543,880
1998 35.7 46.3 15.9 2.1 52,782 3.3 17.3 27.0 52.5 12,540,564
1999 33.6 47.8 17.1 1.5 105,936 3.6 19.6 33.4 43.4 21,610,957
2000 32.7 47.7 17.9 1.8 118,504 3.5 20.2 37.5 38.8 24,238,845
2001 33.9 45.8 18.2 2.1 135,161 3.1 17.5 36.0 43.4 33,992,957
2002 31.7 47.2 19.0 2.2 139,940 2.9 17.9 38.2 41.1 38,902,882
2003 31.1 47.9 18.8 2.2 198,943 2.9 18.2 35.5 43.4 57,767,479
4
1996 32.0 45.3 20.3 2.5 33,847 2.5 14.8 33.7 49.0 8,911,100
1997 29.4 47.5 21.0 2.1 39,558 2.6 16.4 35.1 45.9 10,143,800
1998 27.4 47.8 22.5 2.3 41,573 2.3 16.0 38.7 43.0 11,345,603
1999 27.2 47.5 23.0 2.3 47,453 2.4 16.6 39.1 42.0 13,203,811
2000 25.9 48.3 23.8 2.1 55,302 2.1 16.3 37.1 44.5 16,703,416
2001 26.6 47.1 24.0 2.3 47,076 1.8 14.1 39.3 44.9 18,099,350
2002 24.6 47.7 25.2 2.5 32,446 1.3 13.0 39.1 46.6 16,755,184
2003 24.7 48.9 24.2 2.2 47,198 1.9 17.3 43.2 37.6 18,826,513
Borrower size Borrower size
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Table 4. Evolution of loans by type of lender. Population of new loans 
to non-financial firms granted by Spanish banks. 1996-2003. All size 
brackets correspond to 2003 values. For previous years, inflation 
rates are taken into account.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for borrowers: 1- less than € 100 thousand; 2- more than € 100 thousand and less than € 1,000 thousand; 3- more than
€ 1,000 thousand and less than € 20 million; 4- more than € 20 million 
No. of loans (%) Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Mean 1 2 3 4 Total
Comm. banks
1996 53.5 58.0 66.9 70.1 58.0 50.8 54.0 63.1 74.1 66.0
1997 49.1 54.5 64.1 68.2 54.5 46.6 50.2 57.9 69.1 60.7
1998 47.5 53.3 62.2 62.3 53.1 45.4 49.6 56.3 59.7 56.1
1999 57.3 62.5 67.8 65.2 61.8 54.2 56.1 57.1 57.2 56.9
2000 50.3 56.9 61.8 56.4 55.8 48.1 51.6 51.0 56.8 53.4
2001 43.9 50.0 56.1 53.6 49.3 43.5 47.0 49.2 55.6 51.6
2002 44.9 50.1 55.5 51.1 49.6 42.3 45.2 46.0 53.0 48.7
2003 50.3 54.4 58.5 53.0 53.9 47.6 48.9 49.5 53.5 51.0
Savings banks
1996 40.6 36.9 30.4 27.9 37.1 42.9 40.3 34.2 25.2 31.5
1997 43.9 39.9 32.5 30.3 39.8 46.2 43.8 39.0 30.3 36.5
1998 45.0 40.4 34.0 35.4 40.7 46.9 43.9 40.3 39.7 40.9
1999 36.3 32.0 28.8 32.1 32.8 39.0 37.8 39.6 42.0 40.2
2000 43.4 37.4 34.3 40.7 38.8 45.1 41.9 44.8 42.3 43.2
2001 48.7 43.1 39.0 43.4 44.2 48.8 45.8 46.0 43.3 44.8
2002 45.9 41.8 38.9 45.1 42.6 48.4 46.6 48.4 45.7 46.9
2003 42.4 38.7 36.3 42.4 39.5 45.0 43.5 45.4 45.0 44.9
Cooperatives
1996 5.8 5.1 2.8 2.0 4.9 6.3 5.7 2.7 0.7 2.5
1997 7.0 5.7 3.4 1.5 5.6 7.2 6.0 3.1 0.6 2.8
1998 7.5 6.4 3.8 2.3 6.2 7.8 6.5 3.3 0.6 2.9
1999 6.4 5.5 3.3 2.6 5.3 6.9 6.1 3.3 0.7 2.9
2000 6.3 5.7 3.9 2.9 5.5 6.8 6.5 4.2 0.9 3.3
2001 7.4 6.8 4.9 3.0 6.5 7.8 7.2 4.8 1.0 3.6
2002 9.2 8.1 5.6 3.8 7.9 9.3 8.3 5.6 1.4 4.3
2003 7.3 6.9 5.2 4.6 6.6 7.4 7.5 5.1 1.5 4.1
Borrower size Borrower size
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Table 5. Size breakdown for every type of institution by borrowers 
and loans size. Population of new loans to non-financial firms 
granted by Spanish banks. 1996-2003. All size brackets correspond 
to 2003 values. For previous years, inflation rates are taken into 
account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breakdown for borrowers: 1- less than € 100 thousand; 2- more than € 100 thousand and less than € 1,000 thousand; 3- more than 
€ 1,000 thousand and less than € 20 million; 4- more than € 20 million 
No. of loans (%) Amount of credit (%)
1 2 3 4 Total 1 2 3 4 Total
Comm. banks
1996 35.2 43.8 18.2 2.7 107,888 3.1 15.1 30.2 51.7 23,924,029
1997 31.4 46.3 19.7 2.6 112,353 2.9 16.4 32.3 48.3 25,871,197
1998 29.8 46.9 20.7 2.6 117,136 2.7 16.7 35.2 45.4 28,099,883
1999 30.5 47.2 20.0 2.2 184,902 3.2 18.7 36.7 41.4 37,895,320
2000 28.3 48.3 21.0 2.3 176,112 2.6 17.4 35.6 44.5 42,139,303
2001 28.6 46.8 21.9 2.7 158,511 2.2 14.7 35.0 48.2 49,006,451
2002 28.1 47.6 21.8 2.5 160,163 2.2 15.4 36.6 45.9 49,309,987
2003 28.2 48.3 21.1 2.4 216,086 2.4 17.0 37.3 43.3 65,272,383
Savings banks
1996 41.8 43.6 12.9 1.7 69,056 5.4 23.6 34.2 36.8 11,420,695
1997 38.4 46.3 13.7 1.6 82,100 4.8 23.9 36.2 35.1 15,580,698
1998 36.9 46.4 14.8 1.9 89,707 3.8 20.2 34.6 41.4 20,493,834
1999 36.4 45.5 16.0 2.0 98,216 3.3 17.8 36.0 42.9 26,810,921
2000 35.2 45.7 16.8 2.4 122,461 3.0 17.4 38.7 40.9 34,088,459
2001 35.5 45.1 17.0 2.5 141,956 2.8 16.4 37.6 43.1 42,606,726
2002 33.4 46.3 17.8 2.5 137,486 2.6 16.5 39.9 41.1 47,503,079
2003 32.5 47.0 17.9 2.7 158,123 2.6 17.2 38.9 41.3 57,410,366
Cooperatives
1996 45.0 45.2 8.9 0.9 9,203 10.2 42.6 34.8 12.4 893,788
1997 43.1 46.4 10.0 0.6 11,634 9.8 43.1 37.8 9.2 1,186,340
1998 40.3 48.2 10.7 0.8 13,657 8.8 42.1 40.2 9.0 1,460,066
1999 39.6 47.9 11.4 1.0 15,998 8.0 40.2 41.3 10.5 1,925,405
2000 36.0 49.4 13.4 1.2 17,225 5.9 35.1 47.1 11.9 2,624,711
2001 36.2 48.3 14.4 1.2 21,015 5.7 32.2 49.2 12.9 3,399,086
2002 36.2 48.7 13.9 1.2 25,394 5.3 31.5 49.8 13.3 4,399,414
2003 33.3 49.9 15.1 1.7 26,580 4.6 32.5 47.9 15.0 5,251,865
Borrower size Borrower size
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. 1996-2003. Stratified sample of the whole population of new 
loans to non-financial firms granted by Spanish banks. The stratified 
sample is around 10% of the total population. 
Panel A. Type of bank 
 
 Commercial 
banks 
Savings banks Cooperatives Total 
Average size of the banks (1) 
Median size of the banks (1) 
9,333,828
2,040,839
10,800,000
5,188,326
971,206 
390,308 
6,712,732
1,439,381
Average size of borrowers (2) 
Median size of borrowers (2) 
2,774
204
2,437
153
853 
132 
2,517
174
Average size of loans (1) 
Median size of loans (1) 
217
36
268
43
161 
37 
236
40
% of total loans of the bank that have 
collateral 
18% 35% 27% 26%
% of total loans which are long term 27% 44% 41% 36%
% of total loans with default t-1 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0%
% of total loans with default t+1 1.9% 1,7% 1.6% 1.8%
% of loans to Construction 
 and Real State 
27% 36% 23% 30%
Average Share of main bank (3) 
Median Share of main bank (3) 
72.26%
74.14%
79.04%
89.47%
80.84% 
92.40% 
75.74%
81.48%
Average Interest rates 
Median Interest rates 
6.22%
6.13%
5.96%
5.47%
6.60% 
6.23% 
6.13%
5.73%
 
1) Thousands of euros 
2) Weighted average by number of operations. Thousands of euros 
3) Weighted average by number of operations.  
 
 
Panel B. Size of bank 
 
 Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 
Average size of banks (1) 
Median size of banks (1) 
350,861
292,095
5,125,076
3,461,488
48,500,000 
38,300,000 
75,900,000
49,600,000
Average size of borrowers (2)  
Median size of borrowers (2) 
1113
108
2,121
156
2,813 
177 
3,021
251
Average size of loans (1)  
Median size of loans (1) 
102
24
216
38
235 
36 
321
54
% of total loans of the bank that have 
collateral 
18% 26% 26% 28%
% of total loans which are long term 24% 35% 38% 32%
% of total loans with default t-1(6) 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.1%
% of total loans with default t+1(6) 2.0% 1.9% 1.7% 2.0%
% of loans to Construction and Real State 24% 32% 30% 30%
Average Share of main bank (3) 
Median Share of main bank (3) 
77.38%
83.33%
77.81%
86.33%
74.59% 
78.84% 
72.97%
75.46%
Average Interest rates 
Median Interest rates 
11.49%
8.53%
6.71%
6.24%
5.65% 
5.47% 
4.93%
5.16%
 
1) Thousands of euros, for the period 1996-2003 
2) Weighted average by the number of operations. Thousands of euros, for the period 1996-2003 
3) Weighted average by the number of operations 
Breakdown for banks: 1- less than 1,000 m€; 2- more than 1,000 m€ and less than 25,000 m€; 3- more than 25,000 m€; 4- banks involved 
in mega-mergers above € 25,000 million 
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Table 7. Multinomial logit model of lender choice 
 
 
The dependent variable takes values 1 to 7 depending on the type of bank granting the loan: value 1 for 
small commercial banks; 2 for medium size commercial banks; 3 for large commercial banks; 4 for very 
large commercial banks; 5 for small and medium size savings banks; 6 for large savings banks; and 7 for 
cooperatives. Size of the borrower is the log of the total amount of credit a given firm has at the beginning 
of the period the loan is granted. Size of the loan is the log of the loan size. Collateral is a dummy variable 
worth 1 if the loan has any kind of collateral and 0 otherwise. Long term is a dummy variable worth 1 if 
the maturity of the loan is longer than 5 years and 0 otherwise. Ex ante default (Ex post default) is a 
dummy variable worth 1 if the borrower has defaulted more than 5% of its total amount of credit the year 
before (after) the loan is granted, and 0 otherwise. Share of main bank is the higher percentage a bank 
represents in the total amount of credit for a borrower. Interest rate is the average annual interest rate that 
the bank charges to new loans to non-financial firms. Time, region and industry are different groups of 
dummies for every period (7 dummies), region (16 dummies) and industry (6 dummies) considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The symbol ***/**/* indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
Relative marginal effects are defined as Δp/p, where p is the probability of every class. 
( ) ( ; ; ; ; ; ;
; ; ; ; )
P Class f Size of borrower Size of the loan Collateral Long term Ex ante default Ex post defaulti
Share of main bank Interest Rates Time Region Industry
= − −
2 Size of borrower 0.106 *** 0.133 *** 0.097 *** 0.964
Size of loan 0.237 *** 0.027 -0.037
Collateral -0.276 *** -0.372 *** -23.760
Long term 1.285 *** 0.959 *** -19.775
Ex-ante default 0.333 0.372 0.273 -31.895
Ex-post default 0.074 0.233 0.094 -19.176
3 Size of borrower 0.115 *** 0.144 *** 0.110 *** 2.302
Size of loan 0.217 *** 0.003 -2.460
Collateral -0.682 *** -0.712 *** -57.767
Long term 1.446 *** 1.090 *** -6.656
Ex-ante default 0.598 * 0.648 ** 0.539 -5.376
Ex-post default 0.347 ** 0.489 *** 0.354 * 6.738
4 Size of borrower 0.119 *** 0.121 *** 0.088 *** 0.099
Size of loan 0.391 *** 0.104 *** 7.660
Collateral 0.294 *** 0.147 28.169
Long term 1.068 *** 0.690 *** -46.648
Ex-ante default 0.738 ** 0.617 ** 0.655 * 6.257
Ex-post default 0.319 * 0.340 ** 0.360 * 7.372
5 Size of borrower 0.105 *** 0.116 *** 0.080 *** -0.738
Size of loan 0.329 *** 0.105 *** 7.744
Collateral 0.264 ** 0.143 27.720
Long term 1.445 *** 1.138 *** -1.808
Ex-ante default 0.959 *** 0.887 *** 0.819 ** 22.615
Ex-post default 0.290 0.432 *** 0.332 * 4.535
6 Size of borrower 0.060 *** 0.100 *** 0.072 *** -1.548
Size of loan 0.188 *** -0.069 ** -9.594
Collateral 0.430 *** 0.186 32.057
Long term 1.786 *** 1.511 *** 35.460
Ex-ante default 0.786 ** 0.585 ** 0.594 0.176
Ex-post default 0.292 0.330 ** 0.300 1.353
7 Size of borrower 0.053 *** 0.079 *** 0.040 ** -4.728
Size of loan 0.242 *** 0.041 1.338
Collateral 0.095 0.071 20.570
Long term 1.674 *** 1.358 *** 20.156
Ex-ante default 0.784 ** 0.698 ** 0.622 * 3.002
Ex-post default 0.227 0.411 *** 0.252 -3.399
Control variables Time yes yes yes yes
Region yes yes yes yes
Industry yes yes yes yes
Interest rates yes yes no yes
Share of main bank yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -334,813.12 -334,467.35 -389,929.91 -330,008.47
R squared 0.2371 0.2379 0.1212 0.2481
N 249,669 249,669 251,934 249,669
Relative Marginal
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 effects Model 4Model 3
 Table 8. Multinomial logit model of lender choice limited to 
ownership form of the bank 
 
 
The dependent variable takes values 1 to 3 depending on the type of bank granting the loan: value 1 for 
commercial banks; 2 savings banks; and 3 for cooperatives. Size of the borrower is the log of the total 
amount of credit a given firm has at the beginning of the period the loan is granted. Size of the loan is the 
log of the loan size. Collateral is a dummy variable worth 1 if the loan has any kind of collateral and 0 
otherwise. Long term is a dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the loan is longer than 5 years and 0 
otherwise. Ex ante default (Ex post default) is a dummy variable worth 1 if the borrower has defaulted 
more than 5% of its total amount of credit the year before (after) the loan is granted, and 0 otherwise. 
Share of main bank is the higher percentage a bank represents in the total amount of credit for a 
borrower. Interest rate is the average annual interest rate that the bank charges to new loans to non-
financial firms. Time, region and industry are different groups of dummies for every period (7 dummies), 
region (16 dummies) and industry (6 dummies) considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The symbol ***/**/* indicates the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
1%/5%/10% level. Relative marginal effects are defined as Δp/p, where p is the probability of every class. 
( ) ( ; ; ; ; ; ;
; ; ; ; )
P Class f Size of borrower Size of the loan Collateral Long term Ex ante default Ex post defaulti
Share of main bank Interest Rates Time Region Industry
= − −
2 Size of borrower -0.024 ***
Size of loan -0.033 ***
Size of bank -0.253 ***
Collateral 0.5469 ***
Long term 0.378 ***
Ex-ante default 0.187 ***
Ex-post default 0.0367
Interest rate -0.2426 ***
Share of main bank 0.0064 ***
3 Size of borrower -0.0508 ***
Size of loan -0.0281 ***
Size of bank -1.6864 ***
Collateral 0.31889 ***
Long term 0.7654 ***
Ex-ante default 0.0019
Ex-post default 0.1794 **
Interest rate -0.1596 ***
Share of main bank 0.0076 ***
Control variables Time yes
Region yes
Industry yes
Log likelihood -175,702.00
R squared 0.188
N 249,669
Model 1
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